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Abstract
Product design and advertisement strategy have been theoretically studied as separate
firms decisions. In the present paper, we look at the link between advertisement and product
design and we analyze how firms’ advertising decisions influence the market effect of prod-
uct design. We consider a model of informative advertisement where two firms produce a
bundle of complementary products which are partially compatible. A product design with
more compatible components is associated with a larger intensity of advertisement. Higher
compatibility reduces competition between firms, which incentivizes them to give factual in-
formation about their bundle. Like Matutes and Regibeau (1988), industry profit and total
welfare is maximized with full product compatibility. However, contrary to them, we obtain
that consumer surplus is not monotone with the level of product compatibility and its max-
imum is attained with partial compatibility. Moreover, because consumer surplus not only
depends on the equilibrium prices but also on the intensity of advertisement, we find that for
intermediate equilibrium levels of advertising, consumers prefer fully compatible components
rather than full incompatibility. As a result, a more compatible product design benefits all
the agents in the economy.
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1 Introduction
Economists are well aware that product characteristics beneficial to consumers might end-
up generating lower consumers surpluses. Even if consumers value more reliable and higher
quality products, they may prefer situations where the previous features stay low. The expla-
nation comes from how product characteristics affect market competition. Higher quality or
product reliability, might reduce competition in the market by making the existing products
more heterogeneous. This translates to higher equilibrium prices and hence lower consumer
surpluses. A paradigmatic example is the situation of product compatibility. While making
compatible the components of different products is welfare enhancing, because it allows for
a better match between product components and consumers’ preferences, compatibility also
reduces the competition between assembled products. In this regard, Matutes & Regibeau
(1988) show that consumers with heterogeneous tastes for different components are better-off
in situations where components’ compatibility is low. In their model, the equilibrium price
effect through compatibility dominates the gains coming from a better match. Can we then
achieve a situation where product characteristics that are intrinsically beneficial to consumers,
generate also larger consumer surpluses?
In the present paper, we argue that an alignment of customers surplus and welfare can be
achieved if we extend the firms’ strategy set. The existing marketing literature has extensively
studied the topic of product design, and its resulting affects on the strategic interaction among
firms and its final repercussion on consumers. However, the decision on product design has
been theoretically separated from the product advertisement strategy. In the present paper,
we aim at filling this gap by linking product advertisement and design. We study how the
strategy to advertise influences the market effect of product design.
In this regard, we consider a situation where consumers are not aware of product exis-
tence, and we explore what are the incentives to undertake informative advertisement when
two firms produce a bundle of complementary products that are partially compatible. Firms
do not take compatibility decisions, the level of compatibility is exogenous, but they decide on
the intensity of advertising prior to consumers’ purchasing decisions. We find that advertis-
ing increases both demand and competition, but the effect on the latter is reduced whenever
components are more compatible. Therefore, we find that the equilibrium intensity of adver-
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tisement increases with the level of product compatibility. Our results coincide with Matutes
& Regibeau (1988) regarding industry profit and welfare, where its maximum is attained with
full product compatibility. However, we find opposite results with regards to consumer sur-
plus. Since in our model, the level of product compatibility does not only affect prices but also
the equilibrium intensity of advertisement, consumer surplus is not monotone with the level
of product compatibility and its value is maximized when compatibility is partial. A larger
level of advertisement generates extra demand an the possibility of consumers to “mix and
match” components. Moreover, for some parameters of the model we obtain that consumers
prefer perfect compatible products rather than full incompatibility. Therefore, the existence
of advertisement makes firms and consumers better-off with compatibility and it works as a
mechanism to align players’ preferences over product compatibility.
The present work is related to the existing literature on informative advertising. In this
literature, the role of advertisement is to convey factual information to consumers about the
prices and the specification of the advertised product. Therefore, consumers in the economy
have a passive role as they only learn about the existence of a product when they receive an
advertisement from the firm. Most of the existing literature builds from the work of Butters
(1977), where the advertisement process is specified by assuming that firms send independent
advertisement messages and have no ability to target advertisement to consumers. Grossman
& Shapiro (1984) employ this framework to compare private and social advertisement in
a model of highly differentiated products. They find that equilibrium prices are decreasing
with the level of advertisement and its equilibrium level is socially excessive. Soberman (2004)
extends the previous model and shows that whenever the level of product differentiations is
high, prices increase with the level of advertisement. By assuming an exogenous small level
of product differentiation, we obtain that the equilibrium prices decrease with the intensity of
advertisement. Finally, because consumers do not incur to shopping cost, the advertisement
of prices does not have any effect in our model. In this way, we do not have the possibility
that firms incur to a “loss leader” advertisement strategy as studied in Chen & Rey (2012)
and Ellison (2005).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2), we present the set-up of
the model, and in section (3) we derive consumers’ demand and firms’ profits. Later, in section
(4) we obtain the general formulation of the equilibrium prices and intensity of advertisement.
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We proceed with welfare analysis in section (5). Finally, we conclude in section (6). All proofs
are in the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a model of informative advertisement and partial product compatibility. Follow-
ing Matutes and Regibeau (1988), we have a duopolistic market where each firm i = A,B
produces and sells two maximally differentiated components xi and yi with zero cost of pro-
duction. Firms are located in the extremes of a Hotelling square, firm A is at the origin (0, 0)
and firm B is located at (1, 1). Consumers are uniformly distributed with mass normalized
to 1. A consumer (x, y) has a preferred first component that is x away from firm’s A first
component, and a preferred second component that is y away from firm’s A second compo-
nent. Similarly, her preferred point and firm’s B components are (1 − x) and (1 − y) away
from each component respectively. Therefore, the distances between consumer (x,y) and the
specification of the x and y component sold by either firm A or B are:
Definition 1. dxA = |0− x|, dyA = |0− y|, dxB = |1− y|, and dyB = |1− y|.
We have a static game that consists of two stages. At stage 1, each firm decides on its
intensity of advertisement φi ∈ [0, 1] and sets prices pxi and pyi for each component. The firms
do this simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The intensity of advertisement φi represents
the fraction of the target population that is exposed to the message of firm i. In this regard,
consumers in our model are passive because they only learn about the existence of a product
when they see an advertisement. We denote by E(φ, α) the total expenditure of advertisement,
and the parameter α represents its effectiveness. Therefore, the higher the effectiveness, the
lower is the cost to reach a given fraction of consumers. We assume E′φ(·) > 0; E′′φφ(·) >
0; E′α(·) < 0; and E′′φα(·) < 0, and that the Inada conditions are satisfied.1
At stage 2, consumers make their purchasing decisions. They need a unit of each com-
ponent to form a system which gives them a gross utility of V. If consumers do not receive
any advertisement they are uninformed and cannot effectuate any purchase. If they receive
one advertisement, they are captive consumers and can only effectuate a purchase from the
1Decreasing returns to scale on advertisement might be due to media saturation or heterogeneity of con-
sumers on viewing ads.
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firm of which they are aware. Finally, consumers that receive two advertisements are selective
and can “mix and match” components produced by different firms. Their ability to “mix and
match” depends on the degree of incompatibility between components, represented by the
parameter z ≥ 0, which represents the loss in utility for consumers who consume a bundle of
components produced by different firms.2
Therefore, the utility of uninformed consumers is 0 and they are in the economy with a
proportion of (1− φA)× (1− φB). The utility of a captive consumer (x, y) is
V − (dxi + dyi )− pxi − pyi for i = A,B,
and their proportion in the economy is φA + φB − 2φAφB. Finally, the utility of selective
consumers, in proportion φA × φB, is the same as captive consumers unless when they buy
form different firms. In this latter case, their utility is
V − (dxA + dyB)− pxA − pyB − z,
if they buy component x from firm A and component y from B.
Finally, since firms cannot differentiate consumers that have seen both advertisements or
only their own; price discrimination is not feasible.
3 Demand and Payoffs
With the utility functions of consumers, we can derive the form of the demand function. This
is obtained by identifying the consumer that is indifferent between two alternatives. In order
to simplify the calculations, we make the following assumption regarding the gross utility of
consumption.
Assumption 1. The gross utility of consumption V is large enough to ensure full market
coverage.3
The assumption implies that consumes will always effectuate a purchase. Hence, the indif-
2Consider for instance the installation of some extra plug-ins for a certain software to work with a specific
hardware.
3Later in the paper, we show that for an equilibrium intensity of advertisement φˆ and prices, this is sufficient
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ferent selective consumers are represented in the figure below. Because the characteristics of
the consumers are uniformly distributed, the demand is just the area of the regions represented
in the figure.
FA = (0, 0)
FB = (1, 1)
DAA
DBA
DBB
DAB
1
2 −
pxA−pxB+z
2
1
2 +
pyB−pyA+z
2
1
2 +
pxB−pxA+z
2
1
2 −
pyA−pyB+z
2
Figure 1: Demand for selective customers, where dashed lines represent the set of indifferent con-
sumers.
They are analytically given by:
DA,A =
1
4
[
(1 + pxB − pxA + z)(1 + pyB − pyA + z)− 2z2
]
,
DA,B =
1
4
[
(1 + pxB − pxA − z)(1− pyB + pyA − z)
]
,
where the first and the second under-script stands for the identity of the firm for the first and
second component respectively. We refer to the appendix in page 22 for the calculation of the
demand functions.
Finally, the profit of each firm is the revenue obtained from each group of consumers minus
the total expenditure of advertising. Hence, firm A obtains
piA = (φA × φB)×
[
(pxA + p
y
A)×DA,A + pxA ×DA,B + pyA ×DB,A
]
+ φA × (1− φB)×
(
pxA + p
y
A
)− E(φA, α). (3.1)
to have
2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
φˆ× (1 + z) ≤ V ≤
4− φˆ×
(
φˆ− 2z
(
1− φˆ
))
(1− φˆ)× φˆ× (1 + z) .
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The first line are the revenues obtained by consumers who are aware of both bundles, and the
second are the ones obtained by the consumers that are only know the bundle produced by
firm A. Having defined the profit function, we proceed to obtain the equilibrium price and
intensity of advertisement.
4 Equilibrium
Firms make simultaneous decisions to choose the intensity of advertisement and the price for
each component.4 From the previous demand functions, and the assumption of full coverage,
we observe a conflict between the pricing strategies for each group of consumers: because of
the different competitive pressure, firms want to set low prices to selective consumers and
high prices to those consumers that are captive. Due to the fact that firms cannot price
discriminate, the market equilibrium price is a compromise between those two conflicting
interests, and a pure strategy equilibrium may fail to exist.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in prices and the intensity of adver-
tisement for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and full coverage of consumers.
Proposition 1. In a symmetric equilibrium with full coverage, the price of each component
and the intensity of advertisement is implicitly defined by the following system of equations
(pˆ, φˆ)
pˆ =
(2− φˆ)
φˆ(1 + z)
, (4.1)
Eφ(φˆ, α) =
(2− φˆ)2
φˆ(1 + z)
= pˆ× (2− φˆ), (4.2)
whenever the equilibrium intensity of advertisement is φˆ < 1. The equilibrium price is pˆ(z) =
1
1+z , when the equilibrium intensity of advertisement is φˆ = 1.
The previous expressions are easily obtained from the first order condition of prices and
intensity of advertisement. We relegate the calculation in the appendix page 18, where we
verify that no firm wants to deviates from the proposed equilibrium.
4In our model consumers do not have shopping costs and they are passive. Only firms’ advertisement gives
them information about the existence of the product and market prices. If consumers had shopping costs, it
might not be optimal for the firms to disclose information about prices. At this regard, an optimal strategy is
to advertise one of the components at a loss in order to attract consumers.
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The expressions in the proposition give an implicit solution of the problem and later, we
provide an explicit solution by making use of a specific advertising cost function. Condition
(4.1) tells us that the equilibrium price of each component decreases in both the level of
incompatibility and the intensity of advertisement. When incompatibility rises, selective
consumers tend to buy both components from the same firm. Because in equilibrium, firms
compete for the bundle rather than for separate components, competition is intensified and
the equilibrium price drops. Similarly, when the intensity of advertisement increases, the
relative importance of selective consumers with respect to captive consumers rises, and since
competition occurs only with respect to selective consumers, prices fall.
Condition (4.2) states that the marginal cost of advertising equals its marginal benefit.5
The intensity of advertisement increases with the effectiveness parameter α and decreases
with the level of incompatibility. Because with a larger effectiveness, advertisement becomes
cheaper, a higher proportion of consumers are informed about the product. Since incompati-
bility increases competition for selective consumers, and advertisement intensifies competition
even further, firms decide to reach a lower proportion of consumers in order to keep compe-
tition milder.
Therefore, the level of incompatibility has two opposite effects on the equilibrium price.
The direct effect is that a higher degree of incompatibility makes the selective market more
competitive and the equilibrium price of each component falls. The indirect effect comes from
advertisement. Since advertisement works as mechanism to increase competition, the equilib-
rium intensity of advertisement decreases with the level of incompatibility. Consequently, the
relative importance of captive consumers is larger and prices increase. The following lemma
shows that the direct effect is of first order and an increase of incompatibility unambiguously
reduces the equilibrium market price. The formal proof is in page 20 in the appendix.
Lemma 1. An increase of incompatibility decreases the market equilibrium prices:
dpˆ
dz
≤ 0.
We proceed with welfare analysis, and we see that consumers obtain a larger surplus with
5A unique equilibrium exists. Since the cost function is convex and the right hand side is decreasing with
the intensity of advertisement, there exists only one value of φ such that both expressions cross.
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higher levels of product compatibility. The reason is that whenever firms need to inform about
the existence of the product, consumers’ surplus is not only affected by equilibrium prices but
also by the intensity of advertisement.
5 Welfare
In order to make the analysis tractable, we assume that the reservation price of consumers is
such that the equilibrium stated in proposition 1 exists.
Total welfare in our model is the sum of both industry profit and consumer surplus.
W = Π + CS.
Firms’ profits is the sum of the revenues obtained from selective and captive consumers
minus the expenditure on advertisement:
pi(z, α) =
1
2
φˆ2(·)× 2pˆ(·) + φˆ(·)×
(
1− φˆ(·)
)
× 2pˆ(·)−E(φ, α) =
(
2− φˆ(·)
)2
1 + z
−E(φ, α), (5.1)
and due to symmetry, the total industry profit is 2pi(z, α). Consumer surplus is equal to
CS(z, α) = φˆ(·)×
(
2− φˆ(·)
)
× (V − 2pˆ(·))− IC(z, α)− PC(z, α), (5.2)
where IC(z, α) and PC(z, α) are now defined.
Incompatibility costs, IC(z, α), are incurred only by selective consumers who “mix and
match” components from different firms and equal
IC(z, α) = φˆ2(·)× (DAB +DBA)× z = z
2
(1− z)2 × φˆ2(·), (5.3)
and preference costs, PC(z, α), come from the fact that consumers cannot perfectly match
their preferences with the actual systems in the market. On average, selective consumers have
a lower preference cost than captive consumers, and this is because the former are able to
“mix and match” components from both firms. This equals to
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PC(z, α) = φˆ2(·)×
(
1 + z2
2
)
+ 2φˆ(·)× (1− φˆ(·)), (5.4)
where the first part corresponds to selective consumers and the second to captive consumers.
The derivation of the preference costs is not straightforward and the interested reader is
referred to the appendix page 22. By introducing expressions (5.3) and (5.4) into consumer
surplus we obtain
CS(z, α) = φˆ(·)×
[ (
2− φˆ(·)
)
× (V − 2pˆ(·))− φˆ(·)×
(
z
2
(1− z)2 + 1 + z
2
2
)
− 2
(
1− φˆ(·)
) ]
,
(5.5)
and adding this with the industry profit, yields total welfare
W (z, α) = φˆ(·)×
(
2− φˆ(·)
)
×V − φˆ2(·)×
(
1 + z2
2
+
z
2
(1− z)2 + (2− 2φˆ)
φˆ(·)
)
− 2φˆ
2(·)
α
. (5.6)
We proceed to obtain a closed solution of the model by assuming a specific form of the
expenditure of advertisement.
5.1 Explicit Solution
We assume a particular form for the cost of advertisement
E(φ, α) =
φ2
α
. (5.7)
Differentiating this expression with respect to φ and substituting into (4.2), the equilibrium
intensity of advertisement is equal to
φˆ(z, α) = min
{
2α
α+
√
2α(1 + z)
, 1
}
. (5.8)
Hence, for α < 2(2+z) = α¯(z) there is partial information. By substituting the equilibrium
investment to all previous expressions, we obtain the following results.
In the figure below, we see how the equilibrium intensity of advertisement and prices evolve
with the level of incompatibility.
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α < 2(1 + z) = α¯(z) α ≥ α¯(z)
θ 2α
α+
√
2α(1+z)
1
pˆ(z, α)
√
2√
α(1+z)
1
1+z
Π(z, α) 8α(
α+
√
2α(1+z)
)2 21+z − 2α
IC(z, α) 2α
2(1−z)2z(
α+
√
2α(1+z)
)2 z(1−z)22
PC(z, α)
2α
[
2
√
2α(1+z)+α(z2−1)
]
(
α+
√
2α(1+z)
)2 1+z22
CS(z, α)
2α
[
−8+2(V−1)
√
2α(1+z)+α(1−z)(1+z2)
]
(
α+
√
2α(1+z)
)2 2V (z+1)−(5+2z)−z42(1+z)
SW = Π + CS
2α
[
−4+2(V−1)
√
2α(1+z)+α(1−z)(1+z2)
]
(
α+
√
2α(1+z)
)2 2V (z+1)−(1+2z)−z42(1+z) − 2α
Figure 2: Intensity of advertisement, equilibrium price and welfare indicators. The column on the
left stands for a situation where the effectiveness of advertisement is such that there is partial adver-
tisement, i.e φˆ < 1 and the one on the right stands for full informed market i.e. φˆ = 1.
The dashed lines represent a situation with full advertisement for low values of incompati-
bility. In this case, the decrease in price is more severe than when we have an equilibrium with
partial advertisement. When the market is not fully informed, an increase of incompatibility
creates a decrease on the intensity of advertisement, and this boosts the proportion of captive
consumers in the economy. This last effect, smooths the reduction in prices.6
If we turn to the analysis of welfare, we see that with full advertising, the results are
similar to Matutes and Regibeau (1988). In such a case, both industry profit and welfare
attains its maximum with full product compatibility and consumer surplus is maximized with
full incompatibility CS [z = 0 | α > α¯(z)] < CS [z = 1 | α > α¯(z)]. Here, all results are driven
by equilibrium prices, because all consumers are informed, the intensity of advertisement does
not have any effect on the total demand.
Our contribution stands for analyzing the case where there is an equilibrium with partial
6We have already mentioned that the competition effect is of first order with comparison to the change
in the consumers’ composition. We compare how prices changes with the level of incompatibility in both
equilibria. We observe that the change of prices with the level of incompatibility is larger with a full informed
equilibrium.
∂p
(
z, α | φˆ < 1
)
∂z
= − 2
α(1 + z)2
> − 1
(1 + z)2
=
∂p
(
z, α | φˆ = 1
)
∂z
→ α > 2.
and this is always the case for most of the parameters of efficiency considered.
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φˆ , pˆ
0.83
0.93
0.71
0.58
1
0 1
z
Figure 3: Equilibrium price and intensity of advertisement as a function of the level of incompatibility
z. The thick line represents a situation where the parameter of advertisement efficiency is equal to
α = 2, and the dashed line stands for α = 3.
advertisement and not all consumers are aware of the existence of both systems. In order to
perform this analysis, for the rest of the paper we consider that V = 6
α(z) ≥ 1/2(1 + z) = α(z) (5.9)
In the appendix, page 23, we show that this is necessary to obtain a pure strategy equilibrium
in prices.
Industry profit does not depend on the reservation price of consumers, and this decreases
with the level of incompatibility. Here, we distinguish two effects. When incompatibility
increases so does the equilibrium price, and because the intensity of advertisement also de-
creases, demand is consequently reduced. However, the fall of profits is more accentuated
in a situation when all consumers are informed about the products, since the reduction of
prices in this case is larger. In general, higher efficiency of the advertising technology entails
lower industry profits. With a higher effectiveness of advertisement, firms advertise more in
equilibrium, and the proportion of selective consumers increases, brining about a more intense
competition. This competition effect dominates the increase in demand and the reduction of
the cost of advertisement coming from a more efficient advertising technology.
With regards to consumer surplus, the following proposition states the main result of
the paper. This reveals that consumers are better-off with an intermediate level of product
compatibility.
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Proposition 2. With V = 6 and (5.9) holding, consumer surplus attains its maximum for
an intermediate level of product compatibility whenever the advertising efficiency belongs to
(αˆ, α¯), and αˆ is defined by
10
√
αˆ− αˆ+ 2
√
αˆ3 = 8.
Moreover, whenever α ∈
(
ˆˆα, α¯
)
, where ˆˆα is defined by
−8 + 10
√
2ˆˆα+ ˆˆα(√
2 +
√
ˆˆα
)2 = 4
(
−2 + 5
√
ˆˆα
)
(
2 +
√
ˆˆα
)2 ,
consumers are better with complete product compatibility than full incompatibility.7
The formal proof is in the appendix, page 21. Whenever the market is partially informed,
the level of incompatibility affects not only the equilibrium price, but also the total demand as
well as the demand composition in the market. While with a low level of incompatibility, the
decrease of the equilibrium price dominates the decrease in the intensity of advertisement, for
high levels of incompatibility, the reduction in the level of advertisement, and the subsequent
increase in the preference costs, dominates the effect of the price decrease. Consequently, the
average consumer is worse-off. In general, consumers prefer to be better informed about the
products offered in the market at the expense of higher equilibrium prices. In the figure 4
below, we illustrate how consumers’ surplus varies with z, the level of incompatibility and as
shown in the proposition, its maximum is attained with an intermediate level of compatibility.
The level of incompatibility also plays a role the evolution of both incompatibility and
preference costs. For low values of incompatibility, the total incompatibility cost increases with
incompatibility as selective consumers who “mix and match” pay this cost. For large values
of incompatibility, the total incompatibility costs decrease, because there are less selective
consumers in the market, due to lower advertisement, and also a smaller proportion of these
consumers decide to “mix and match”. Preference costs are an increasing function on the level
of incompatibility. A lower intensity of advertisement, due to an increase of incompatibility,
reduces the proportion of selective consumers while the proportion of captive consumers is
increased. Because captive consumers have on average a larger preference costs, the total
7There is only one αˆ and ˆˆα that solve the previous equations. See page 21 in the appendix for the formal
proof.
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preference cost in the economy is increased. A lower proportion of selective consumers will
“mix and match” components, and the preference costs are accordingly increased.
Furthermore, we observe that increases in the advertising effectiveness unambiguously
increases consumers surplus. Not only prices are lower in equilibrium, but also consumers are
better informed about the existing products, because the intensity of advertisement is bigger.
SW , CS , Π
0.68
0.58
3.48
3.83
4.17
4.4
4.8
4.5
3.5
1.34
1
0 1
z
Figure 4: Industry profit, consumer surplus and social welfare as a function of the level of incompati-
bility z. The thick line represents a situation where the parameter of advertisement efficiency is equal
to α = 2, and the dashed line stands for higher efficiency α = 3.
Finally, welfare always decreases with the level of incompatibility. Because prices are just
a transfer from consumers to firms an increase in incompatibility unambiguously decreases
welfare.8 Incompatibility does not only create a higher preference cost as the proportion
of consumers who “mix and match” is decreased, but in our model it also decreases the
equilibrium intensity of advertisement. Less advertisement, creates a reduction of demand as
the proportion of uninformed consumers increases.
Therefore, whenever firms have to undertake advertisement to inform about the existence
8This is the case as we are working with full coverage. Otherwise, the equilibrium price would have an effect
on social welfare as it has an effect on total demand.
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of the products, all agents have similar preferences regarding the level of product compatibility.
We have shown that for some parameters firms and consumers are better-off with full product
compatibility. Moreover, efficient advertising in our model works as a way to increase potential
demand but it also fosters competition. This second effect is reduced by making products
compatible. Hence, we have found two instruments that firms might use to increase profits.
One is to increase compatibility, the other is to agree on having an inefficient advertising
technology.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that intrinsic beneficial characteristics, such as product com-
patibility, create larger consumer surpluses if we extend the firms’ strategy set. In our model,
higher product compatibility generates lower competition which translate to higher prices.
However, lower competition incentivizes firms to convey information about their product,
which generates a demand increase and a better match between products and consumers’ pref-
erences. In contrast with previous literature, we find that consumer surplus is non-monotonic
on the level of incompatibility and it has an inverse U-shaped form. A competition authority
should then be careful about possible actions aiming at increasing the consumer surplus such
as increasing market competition. Larger competition between firms might be achieved by
making existing products less compatible. However, we have seen that increasing the level
of competition might have detrimental effects to consumers, because they are less informed
about the purchasing possibilities in the market.
Following the existing literature on informative advertising, we have considered that con-
sumers are passive as they do not engage into any active search to find about the products
offered in the market. Furthermore, consumers do not incur to any shopping costs when
they commute to the firm to effectuate a purchase. This assumption simplifies the analysis
tremendously, because the decision of firms referring to what component and what price to
advertise is not relevant. However, if consumers experienced some positive shopping costs it
might be in the interest of the firms to practice some sort of “loss leader” advertising strategy
as studied in Chen & Rey (2012). We believe that as long as a “loss leader” strategy softens
competition, the intensity of advertisement will be larger in equilibrium. However, the results
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on consumer surplus are not clear. Prices will be larger in equilibrium but consumers will
also be more informed about the consumption alternatives in the marketplace. In the cur-
rent model, we have also considered that consumers are distributed uniformly over the unit
square. This assumption implies that consumers do not have brand preferences. By relaxing
this assumption, we believe that competition for selective consumers would be heavily reduced
implying also a boost on the level of advertisement.
Moreover, firms in the model are not able to perform price discrimination, consumers that
purchase the bundled product pay the sum of the pice for each component. An interesting
extension is to consider how our results change if we allow firms to effectuate a discount for
those consumers that buy both components from the same firm. We conjecture that allowing
for this strategy gives an extra instrument to firms to increase competition. Therefore, a
decrease on the equilibrium price might bring about a lower intensity of advertisement, and
this might be detrimental to consumers.
Finally, we have assumed that the level of compatibility and the effectiveness of advertise-
ment are exogenous in the model. It might be interesting to consider endogenous compatibility
choice by firms. Firms would like to have full compatibility since this reduces the competition
for selective consumers. Therefore, in a previous stage, firms decide on how to make their
components compatible, or at least until which degree. With regards to the effectiveness of
advertisement, we have seen that this has the strategic effect of a prisoners’ dilemma. The
more effective advertisement is, the more firms increase the intensity of advertisement and
the more fierce competition becomes. Therefore, in a stage before the market game, firms
might tacitly collude on using an ineffective advertising technology.
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Appendices
A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: We start by assuming that a pure strategy in prices exist, and later we
derive the necessary conditions to ensure that no firm wants to deviate form this proposed equilibrium.
Each firm chooses the intensity of advertisement and the level of prices to maximize its profit
given by expression (3.1). The equilibrium is obtained by the solution of the system of the first order
conditions given by:
∂pii
∂pxi
= 0→φiφj
[
Di,i′ +Di,j + (p
x
i + p
y
i′)×
∂Di,i′
∂pxi
+ pxi ×
∂Di,j
∂pxi
+ pyi′ ×
∂Dj,i
∂pxi
]
+ φi(1− φj)
[
Dci + (p
x
i + p
y
i′)×
∂Dci
∂pxi
]
= 0, for i = i′ and; i 6= j
∂pii
∂pyi′
= 0→φiφj
[
Di,i′ +Dj,i′ + (p
x
i + p
y
i′)×
∂Di,i′
∂pyi′
+ pyi′ ×
∂Dj,i′
∂pyi′
+ pxi ×
∂Di,j
∂pyi′
]
φi(1− φj)
[
Dci + (p
x
i + p
y
i′)×
∂Dci
∂pyi′
]
= 0, for i = i′ and; i 6= j
∂pii
∂φi
= 0→φj [(pxi + pyi′)×Di,i′ + pxi ×Di,j + pyi′ ×Dj,i′ ] + (1− φj)(pxi + pyi′)×Dci = Eφi(φi, α).
Because we are restricting attention to the case where captive consumers are fully covered, we get
that the demand for the selective consumers is equal to Dci = 1 and the partial derivatives are zero
i.e. ∂Dci /∂p
x
i = ∂D
p
i /∂p
y
i′ = 0. Therefore, by adding this constraints and the demand forms in both
pricing expressions, we obtain:
∂pii
∂pxi
= 0→ φi
[
(1− φj) + (pxj − 2pxi )φj + (pyj − 2pyi′)φjz
]
2
= 0→ pxi =
1
2
(
pxj −
φj − 2
φj(1 + z)
)
∂pii
∂pyi′
= 0→ φi
[
(1− φj) + (pyj − 2pyi′)φj + (pxj − 2pxi′)φjz
]
2
= 0→ pyi′ =
1
2
(
pyj −
φj − 2
φj(1 + z)
)
,
and with the conditions for pxj and p
y
j we obtain that the prices for each component is the same
pxi = p
y
i′ = pi =
φi(4− 3φj) + 2φj
3φiφj(1 + z)
; pxj = p
y
j′ = pj =
φj(4− 3φi) + 2φi
3φiφj(1 + z)
.
Because, the cost of advertisement is the same for both firms, they also set the same intensity of
advertisement φˆi = φˆj = φˆ. As a result, the equilibrium price for each component is
pi = pj =
2− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
.
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By substituting the equilibrium prices and the demands in the first order condition of each firm
with respect to the intensity of advertisement, we obtain that the equilibrium intensity of advertisement
is
Eφ(φ, α) = φˆ×
[
4− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
×Di,i′ + 2− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
×Di,j + 2− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
×Dj,i′
]
+ (1− φˆ)×
(
4− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
)
= φˆ×
(
4− φˆ
2φˆ(1 + z)
)
+ (1− φˆ)×
(
4− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
)
= (2− φˆ)×
(
2− φˆ
φˆ(1 + z)
)
.
Finally, to be sure that the previous conditions constitute an equilibrium, we need to verify that no
firm wants to deviate from the proposed equilibrium and all consumers are covered. Due to the different
incentives for pricing the captive and selective consumers there might exist an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Each firm has a monopoly position over their captive consumers and face competition only
over the selective ones. Therefore the mixed strategy equilibrium appears due to the trade-off from the
incentive to extract the whole reservation price form her captive consumers, or undercut the price to
attract selective consumers. The following lemma establishes the reservation value for consumers such
that no firm wants to deviate from the prices stated in proposition 1 and all consumers are covered.
Lemma 2. There equilibrium of the game is in pure strategies as stated in proposition 1 if consumer’s
reservation price is V ∈ [V (z, α), V¯ (z, α)] and
V (z, α) =
2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
φˆ× (1 + z) ; V¯ (z, α) =
4− φˆ×
(
φˆ− 2z
(
1− φˆ
))
(1− φˆ)× φˆ× (1 + z) ,
where the equilibrium intensity of advertisement φˆ(z, α) is implicitly defined in equation (4.2).
We then need to verify that, with the proposed equilibrium price, all captive consumers purchase
the good and that no firm can obtain a larger profit by extracting the whole surplus from his captive
consumers. In our model as both the equilibrium price and intensity of advertisement depend on the
level of incompatibility, so is the range for the reservation price of consumers that allows for a pure
strategy equilibrium. Hence we obtain a full coverage of captive consumers if their net utility from
consumption is not negative V ≥ 2+2× pˆ(φˆ, z), and by using the equilibrium price given by expression
(4.1) we obtain
V ≥ 2 + 2(2− φˆ)
φˆ(1 + z)
=
2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
φˆ× (1 + z) = V (z, φˆ).
It is not profitable to extract the whole surplus from captive consumers by setting a price of each
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component equal to p = (V − 2)/2 if
1
2
φˆ22pˆ(·) + φˆ(1− φˆ)2pˆ(·)− φˆ
α
≥ φˆ(1− φˆ)2×
(
V − 2
2
)
− φˆ
α
→ (2− φˆ)pˆ(·) ≥ (1− φˆ)(V − 2d)
V ≤ (2− φˆ)
2 + 2(1− φˆ)φˆ(1 + z)
(1− φˆ)φˆ(1 + z) =
4− φˆ×
(
φˆ− 2z
(
1− φˆ
))
(1− φˆ)× φˆ× (1 + z) = V¯ (z, α).
Hence, we work with the case where the gross utility from consumption is V ∈ [V (z, α), V¯ (z, α)].
When the incompatibility increases, the equilibrium price of each component decreases and this makes
the upper and the lower bound to decrease. For any value of effectiveness of investment α ∈ R+ and
level of incompatibility z ∈ (0, 1) we obtain
V¯ (z, α) =
4− φˆ×
(
φˆ− 2z
(
1− φˆ
))
(1− φˆ)× φˆ× (1 + z) ≥
2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
φˆ× (1 + z) = V (z, φˆ)→
4− φˆ×
(
φˆ− 2z
(
1− φˆ
))
(1− φˆ) ≥ 2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
→ φˆ < 4
1 + z
,
and the above is always the case since φˆ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of lemma 1: We calculate the first order condition of the equilibrium price given by
expression (4.1) with respect to the level of incompatibility.
dpˆ
(
φˆ(z), z
)
dz
=
−∂φˆ(z)∂z ×
(
φˆ(z)× (1 + z)
)
−
[(
∂φˆ(z)
∂z × (1 + z) + φˆ(z)
)(
2− φˆ(z)
)]
(
φˆ(z)× (1 + z)
)2
=
direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
−φˆ(z)×
(
2− φˆ(z)
)
+
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷[
−∂φˆ(z)
∂z
× 2(1 + z)
]
(
φˆ(z)× (1 + z)
)2 .
The second part of the numerator represents the indirect effect that incompatibility has on prices
and this depends on how an increase of incompatibility affects the equilibrium level of advertisement.
This is positive as the intensity of advertisement decreases with the level of incompatibility ∂φˆ(z)/∂z <
0. The first part of the numerator stands for the direct effect and this is always negative. We obtain
that the direct effect dominates and the expression above is negative if the decrease on the equilibrium
intensity of advertisement with incompatibility is relatively mild, i.e, −∂φˆ(z)∂z < φˆ(z)×(2−φˆ(z))2(1+z) . To show
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that this is always the case, we differentiate equation (4.2) with respect to the level of incompatibility.
0 =
−2×
(
2− φˆ(z)
)
× ∂φˆ(z)∂z ×
(
φˆ(z)× (1 + z)
)
−
[(
∂φˆ(z)
∂z × (1 + z) + φˆ(z)
)
×
(
1− φˆ(z)
)2]
φˆ(z)× (1 + z)2
→ −∂φˆ(z)
∂z
=
(
2− φˆ(z)
)
× φˆ(z)(
φˆ(z) + 2
)
× (1 + z)
,
and buy introducing this in the previous expression, this is easy to verify that(
2− φˆ(z)
)
× φˆ(z)(
φˆ(z) + 2
)
× (1 + z)
<
φˆ(z)×
(
2− φˆ(z)
)
2(1 + z)
⇐⇒ 4−2φˆ(z) <
(
2− φˆ(z)
)
×
(
φˆ(z) + 2
)
⇐⇒ φˆ(z) < 2.
Hence, since φˆ ∈ [0, 1] the above is always true and we have shown that the equilibrium price
decreases with the level of product incompatibility.
Proof of proposition 2: We restrict our analysis to the case with partial informed equilibrium
and hence the advertising efficiency parameter is α ∈ (α, α¯). To obtain that the maximum consumer
surplus is obtained with an intermediate level of product compatibility, we calculate the derivative of
the consumer surplus with respect to z.
dCS(z, α)
dz
=
2α2
[
8
√
2 +
√
α(1 + z)× (zα(2− 3z)− α− 10) +√2α× (3− 2z (z + z2 − 1))]√
α(1 + z)×
(
α+
√
2α(1 + z)
)3 ,
and this is a continuous function with respect to both the intensity of advertisement (α) and the level
of incompatibility. To show that the function is concave in z for the range of the effectiveness of
advertisement considered, we do not rely on the second derivative as its expression is complicated but
rather we calculate the sign of the derivative at both extremes of the level of incompatibility. Hence,
we obtain:
dCS(z, α)
dz
∣∣∣z=0 = −2
(
10
√
α− 8√2− 3√2α+ α3/2)
(
√
2 +
√
α)3
,
dCS(z, α)
dz
∣∣∣z=1 = 2
(
8− 10√α+ α− 2α3/2)
(2 +
√
α)3
.
It is easy to see that for any α ∈ (α, α¯) we get that the derivative evaluated at z = 0 is always
positive. Hence, in order to have a concave function with respect to z we need that the derivative
evaluated at z = 1 to be negative. This is the case when 8 − 10√α + α − 2α3/2 < 0 and this occurs
whenever α > αˆ where αˆ is the solution 10
√
αˆ− αˆ+ 2
√
αˆ3 = 8. To verify that the threshold αˆ is inside
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the range of the values of α considered, we see that the right hand side ג(α) = 10
√
α − α + 2
√
α3 is
increasing in α since ∂ג(α)∂α =
5+3α√
α
− 1 > 0. Finally, by evaluating the the function at the extremes
ג(α) = 10
√
1
4 − 14 + 2
√
1
4
3
< 8 and ג(α¯) = 10
√
4 − 4 + 2
√
43 > 8 we obtain that αˆ is in the interval
considered.
To show that consumers are better off with full product compatibility that incompatibility we just
need to compare the value of the consumer social welfare at both extremes.
CS (z = 0 | α < α¯(z)) = −8 + 10
√
2α+ α(√
2 +
√
α
)2 ≥ 4 (−2 + 5√α)
(2 +
√
α)
2 = CS (z = 1 | α < α¯(z)) ,
and it can be seen that this is the case whenever α > ˆˆα where ˆˆα is the solution −8+10
√
2ˆˆα+ˆˆα(√
2+
√
ˆˆα
)2 −
4
(
−2+5
√
ˆˆα
)
(
2+
√
ˆˆα
)2 = 0. Finally, we need to verify that the values of the threshold is inside the range and by
applying the same procedure as before we prove the claim.
Derivation of demand: When the gross utility of consumption V is large enough such that all
costumers are covered we can easily obtain the demands for selective consumers by first obtaining the
indifferent consumer (x,y) as represented in figure 1 in the main text. Since we have assumed that
consumes are uniformly distributed, the demand is just the area for the different regions.
Di,j =
(
1
2
− p
x
i − pxj + z
2
)
×
(
1−
(
1
2
+
pyj − pyi + z
2
))
=
(
1− pxi + pxj − z
2
)
×
(
1− pyj + pyi − z
2
)
=
1
4
[
(1 + pxj − pxi − z)(1− pyj + pyi − z)
]
for i 6= j.
Di,i′ =
(
1
2
+
pxj − pxi + z
2
)
×
(
1
2
+
pyj − pyi′ + z
2
)
−
[
1
2 +
pxj−pxi +z
2 −
(
1
2 −
pxi−pxj +z
2
)]2
2
=
(
1− pxj − pxi + z
2
)
×
(
1 + pyj − pyi′ + z
2
)
− z
2
2
=
1
4
[
(1 + pxj − pxi + z)(1 + pyj − pyi′ + z)− 2z2
]
for i = i′ and; i 6= j.
Derivation of preference costs: The average preference cost of the captive consumer for each
component is vx = vy = 1/2 and the average preference cost for the consumption of both components
is PCc = 1. To obtain the average preference cost of the selective consumers depends on the region
that a given consumer belongs to, and this is represented in the figure below.
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FA = (0, 0)
FB = (1, 1)
b
a
′
b
′
a
c
d
d
′
c
′
1
2 − z2
1
2 +
z
2
1
2 +
z
2
1
2 − z2
In this table, we compute the mass of each region (mi) and the average distance for each component
ivx and ivy for i = a, b, c, d, a
′
, b
′
, c
′
, d
′
.
Point Proportion Averages Total: (vx + vy)× d×m
a ma =
(λ−z)2
4λ2
avx = avy =
λ−z
4λ
(λ−z)3
8λ2
b mb =
λ2−z2
4λ2
bvx =
λ−z
4λ , bvy =
λ+z
4λ
λ2−z2
8λ
c mc =
z(λ−z)
2λ2
cvx =
1
2 , cvy =
λ−z
4λ
z(λ−z)(3λ−z)
8λ2
d md =
z2
2λ2
dvx = dvy =
1
2
z2
2λ
a
′
ma′ =
(λ−z)2
4λ2
a
′
vx = a
′
vy =
λ−z
4λ
(λ−z)3
8λ2
b
′
mb′ =
λ2−z2
4λ2
b
′
vx =
λ+z
4λ b
′
vy =
λ−z
4λ
λ2−z2
8λ
c
′
mc′ =
z(λ−z)
2λ2
c
′
vx =
λ−z
4λ c
′
vy =
1
2
z(λ−z)(3λ−z)
8λ2
d
′
md′ =
z2
2λ2
d
′
vx = d
′
vy =
1
2
z2
2λ
PCs =
(1− z)3
4
+
1− z2
4
+
z(1− z)(3− z)
8
+
z2
2
=
1 + z2
2
.
Therefore, we obtain that the preference cost in the economy is equal to
PC = φˆ2 × PCs + 2φˆ(1− φˆ)PCc = φˆ2 × 1 + z
2
2
+ 2φˆ(1− φˆ).
Bounds of V : Here, with a reservation price of V = 6 we determine the value of α such that we
have an equilibrium in pure strategies as stated in lemma 2. Therefore, we need that the reservation
price of consumers be inside the interval 6 ∈ [V , V¯ ].
6 ≥ V =
2×
(
2 + φˆz
)
φˆ× (1 + z) → φˆ ≥
2
3 + 2z
→ 2α
α+
√
2α(1 + z)
≥ 2
3 + 2z
→ α ≥ 1
2(1 + z)
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6 ≤ V¯ = 2 + (2− φˆ)
2
(1− φˆ)φˆ(1 + z) → φˆ
(
8− 5φˆ+ 4z − 4φˆz
)
≤ 4,
and it is easy to see that the second condition is fulfilled for any equilibrium advertising intensity φˆ
and we only need to be sure that the effectiveness of advertisement is above the value represented in
the first condition.
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